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Derrida constantly repeats the gesture of warning us against the police, only
to tell us later that we need not worry: they are our friends, it was not a
warning. E.g., he says that if the absence which is said to characterize written
communication was shown to be a condition of all signs, the traditional
conception of writing "would appear to be noncritical, ill-formed, or
destined, rather, to insure the authority and the force of a certain historical
discourse" (Sec 7). The words preceding "or" are best ignored.* Still, the
second half of the sentence suggests the cultural critique of false
consciousness: surely nobody wants to be caught insuring "the authority and
the force of a certain historical discourse"! Derrida was asking to be
misunderstood or overemphasized in creating the implied reader of his essay
—and I do not think this escaped his attention, or that he is so clumsy a
writer as not to be able to control the tone that will convey his meaning.
This duplicity is at work behind every definite statement in Limited Inc—
Derrida's project is eminently ambiguous, since it both suggests and denies
that it has implications for the theory of interpretation. He announces the
break with the conception of communication as communication of
consciousnesses, the disqualification ("or the limiting"!) of the concept of
context, etc. (Sec 8-9), only to let them in through the back door. From the
structural possibility of infelicitous speech acts, Derrida concludes that "the
opposition success / failure [échec] in illocution and in perlocution thus
seems quite insufficient and extremely secondary [dérivée]" (Sec 15). They
can only be said so by someone who can speak of "the teleological lure of
consciousness" (Sec 18) as if an account of communication which did not
use the concept of consciousness were possible.
Derrida speaks of Austin's theory as if it conceived of people as
preternaturally self-conscious and hyper-legislatively-minded creatures: "In
order for the context to be exhaustively determinable, in the sense required
by Austin, conscious intention would at the very least have to be totally
present and immediately transparent to itself and to others, since it is a
determining center [foyer] of context" (Sec 18). But, as Derrida himself notes
in "Limited inc a b c," consciousness does not imply self-consciousness. And
the context does not have to be exhaustively determined. Rather, it is
assumed to be determined unless an interlocutor asks for further
specification, or behaves in a way that shows that his assumptions about the
context are different. In a characteristic gesture, Derrida accepts the notion of
consciousness and normal circumstances, but giving them a marginal place
in his theory: "those effects do not exclude what is generally opposed to
them. . . ; on the contrary, they presuppose it, in an asymmetrical way, as the
general space of their possibility" (Sec 19). "They presuppose it" in a
metaphysical consideration of language—not in a description of language
use, like speech act theory. This move also equivocates, by  introducing in a
theory of language use a set of considerations which are quite irrelevant to it.
Normal circumstances, serious or felicitous speech acts work as normative
principles precisely in that they do not presuppose their "other"—they are the
unmarked case.** Speakers assume that an utterance is literal unless they
have a reason to think otherwise. A literal utterance is not interpreted through
its contrary, or exhaustively compared to its context. The intrinsic,
unmarked, normal context which is a part of the locutionary meaning of a
sentence is enough to interpret it if it does not run against the extrinsic
context of the utterance. On the contrary, to interpret a lie as a lie we cannot
help but set it against its other, the true statement it purported to be.
To the extent that Derrida obscures this circumstance, he is not putting
forward a theory of interpretation—he is noting the presence in theories of
interpretation of the same logic of purity and impurity which is present in
other semiotic areas, like the construction of sexuality or the cultural notions
of East and West. This analysis does not have the same implications in all of
these fields. I can easily conceive a theory of culture without chauvinist
cultural hierarchies; it is much more difficult to devise a workable theory of
communication which renounces the notions of literal meaning or felicitous
speech act as regulative elements used by the speakers. At least Derrida has
not provided one. He wants to be both Fish and Hirsch. In ordinary speech,
he allows the presence of intention or literal meaning as "derivative" effects;
when he analyzes the source of the derivation, he can't help using the notions
of presence, center and consciousness.
The blind spot which opens the visibility of the text is its absent center.***
The principles of writing and supplementarity Derrida finds in Rousseau's
writing are, it seems, central in these texts. They represent the mise en abyme
of that textuality: "Et nous verrons que l'abîme n'est pas ici un accident . . . "
(Dlg 233). Moreover, this blind spot is a (present) center in Derrida's critical
commentary. Derrida continually uses the language of essence and presence.
Is deconstruction yet another discovery of centers? What is the sense of
"formulating," "producing laws" or essays with an "axial purpose," putting
forward "ultimate justifications" or constituting a "theory of structural
necessity" (Dlg 233)? By "preserving" the "vulgar concepts" (of writing,
intention, etc.) and setting them in a wider frame, Derrida's theory still has a
thrust towards totalization.****
To the extent that a theory is an intentional construct and its raison d'être is
the conscious recognition or establishment of relationships, Derrida's writing
is a misguided experiment in mise en abyme—I suspect that his silence on
this aspect of his writing is a wilful desire to have his text victimized by the
same law it denounces, but his equivocations about the implications of the
extended concept of writing make him play down the role of his own text as
an intentional construct. The text is unnecessarily victimized. Its effectivity
is therefore doubly impaired, conceptually and rhetorically.
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Notes
* Cf. "Limited Inc abc..." 98. Derrida's use of "or," "or rather" (do they
introduce the same in a different phrasing? the radically other?) is highly
instructive as a practical example of terrorisme obscurantiste, or rather of
deconstructive undecidability.
** As to the debate on the status of fiction, Searle and Derrida speak at
cross-purposes because neither of them is willing to move into the
reasonable middle-ground: that producing fiction (i.e., 'non-serious'
speech acts) is itself a serious speech act. A theory along these lines is put
forward by Mary Louise Pratt, Toward a Speech Act Theory of Literary
Discourse. Bloomington: Indiana UP, 1977.
*** De la grammatologie 234. Or is it the absent center of the text as it is
seen by the critic? This view, which would seem to use a more critical
version of presence, does not seem to be favored by Derrida.
**** The counter-movement, which denounces the absurdity of this kind
of enterprise, is fraught with false steps. For instance, in "Limited inc" 39
he speaks of "the interminable character" of speech act analysis, because
the analysis itself must be a speech act. Derrida might equally well
denounce the absurdity of a book on syntax on the basis that it must use
syntactic constructions to describe syntax.
—oOo—
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